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"left"?were

willing to continue sharing in the orderly division of re?
for the recent past. Moreover,
some of the controversy
sponsibility
aroused in Germany by Fritz Fischer's work began to invigorate
Aus?
trian historical studies. Both in Austria and abroad, historians became
less inclined to treat Austria as a unique case, and increasingly
interested
in the Alpine state as a study in the general development
of contem?
central
Norbert
The
of
Der
porary
Europe.
publication
Schausberger's
in
nach
Osterreich
fortieth
of
the
Griff
early 1978?the
anniversary
in some respects a milestone in this direction; it pro?
Anschluss?marked
to review a sampling ofthe
vides the opportunity
cent literature, and to reflect, as well, on some
Austrian history.
conceptualizing
contemporary

more interesting
general

problems

ambitious and important study contains not only a
Schausberger's
tailed analysis of the Anschluss problem, but a general interpretation
central European history in the interwar period. To a large degree,
are less original than carefully buttressed reaffirmations
conclusions
traditional

re?
of
de?
of
his
of

social democratic

his book will
Nevertheless,
interpretations.
become a key source in the network of literature on twentieth-century
Austria because it is the first comprehensive
survey which systematically
fits the Anschluss story into the framework
in modern German history.
"continuity"

of debate on the problem of
of analysis,
(The vocabulary

like the title, appears to have been directly inspired by Fischer's Griff
nach der Weltmacht.) Schausberger's
style is compact, his arguments are
and
he
writes
with a special eye to socioeco?
skillfully documented,
them
to
nomic problems,
relating
diplomatic
history in the spirit of
Primat der Innenpolitik. His economic
analysis?a
eclectic, inspired by elements of both Marxist
He also writes with an explicit didactic purpose:
mythic nationalism
Anschluss literature

which

survive

in much

the idea ofa

personal specialty?is
and Keynesian
theory.
to dispel the residues of

of the German-language
German-Austrian
"com?

by exposing
veneer which masked the rapacious
munity of destiny" as an ideological
and strategic designs of the German power elite. Like much
economic
book reflects the
ofthe current "continuity"
literature, Schausberger's
in
climate
central
critical
ofthe recent
Europe: radically
present political
order.
past, it tacitly endorses the present neoliberal/social-democratic
In Austrian terms, this means that it is a contribution
to the task of
"building

an Austrian

Schausberger
nomic analysis

devotes

nation."
considerable

of interwar

Austrian

attention
politics.

to the social

and eco?

For the elite, he argues,
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a balm for the "psychic dis?
Germany
promised
and the collapse of empire.
followed
defeat
military
der Staat
But rump Austria was not, contrary to widespread
opinion,
den keiner wollte. In Schausberger's
view, independence,
though imposed
union

with

content"

Weimar

which

to the course of historical devel?
by the western powers, "corresponded
and
was
the
Anschluss was an
rapidly accepted by
opment,
populace."
and
idea which had to be energetically
the
most powerful
cultivated,
Austria
legend created to justify union was the notion that independent
was

survival. This fallacious idea
lebensunfahig, incapable of economic
into a self-fulfilling
that it developed
became so ingrained
prophecy;
from the be?
few would dare invest in the future ofa state condemned
capital was the greatest eco?
ginning to die, and the lack of investment
was not a
nomic weakness ofthe First Republic.
Austria, he concludes,
its
in
which
"state" but an "economy"
the
will,
against
myth of eco?
functioned
in much the same
nonviability
propagandistically
in
as
the
Dolchstoss
way
legend
Germany.
While critical of Socialist leaders on various grounds,
Schausberger
the primary responsibility
of Christian
Socialism
emphasizes
strongly
nomic

for Austria's

destruction.

Another

important
legend?second
only to
the idea that Ignaz Seipel and his
in the 1920s. In fact, the ultimate
was unwittingly
but powerfully
assisted by

the myth of Lebensunfahigkeit?was
financial aides "saved" the economy
of the Anschluss

triumph

anachronistic

to capital but hosdeflationary
Seipel's
policies?"friendly
tile to people"?which
condemned
Austria to staggering
unemploy?
ment and fueled social and political unrest. Matters were complicated
by the nostalgic
policies of the big banks, which tried to perpetuate
Vienna's role as the financial center of Danubian Europe instead of comto restructuring
the Austrian economy.
These poli?
Dollfuss
at
a
when
time,
maintains,
by
Schausberger
in other countries
were already making
of
use
practical

mitting themselves
cies were continued
economists

in Schuschnigg's
absurd
theory; they culminated
historically
to revive a medieval
of illusion,"
social order and
designed
"politics
It
it
on
modern
was
little
wonder
that Christian
a
economy.
impose
no practical alternative
Social policy provided
to the Anschluss idea,
Keynesian

even

in its National

Socialist

guise.

is not on Austria's domes?
Schausberger's
major emphasis, however,
of German policy
toward
Austria.
tic affairs but on the continuity
the
era
of
for
world
he
Germany's
quest
Throughout
power,
argues,
Austria played the same key role in the autarchic vision ofthe German
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before 1914, Austria was seen as an
to
the
southeast; for German imperialists
springboard"
"indispensable
to the Nazi period, the Griff nach Osterreich was
from the Wilhelmine
and military

financial

elite. Even

as the first stage of expansion into the Balkans.
of the tradi?
In texture, this argument strikes one as a combination
of imperialism
tional economic
by Hobson
popularized
interpretation
at the turn of the century, and of the
and Marxists such as Hilferding

conceived

diplomatic history. On the one hand,
relationship
Schausberger
quotes Nikolai Bukharin on the symbiotic
between big finance and the modern state, and reaffirms the validity of
of fascism as the capitalist
classic socialist defmition
Franz Neumann's

fashionably

au courant in German

crisis. On the other, he touches all the
to a social-revolutionary
bases in his effort to fit the story of interwar
latest historiographical
of the Fischer thesis. He
relations into the framework
Austro-German
answer

emphasizes Austria's economic importance to German strategists, arguing that the full significance of her resources for German in?
appreciated in the past. It is in his careful
dustry has been insufficiently
of this aspect ofthe story that he makes his most original
documentation

particularly

research

contribution.

of Der Griff nach Osterreich are, to a great extent, the
and Fischer theses.
result of dangers inherent in the Hobson-Hilferding
of
both is sophistiand
Schausberger's
application
By
large, however,
In general, he is commendably
documented.
cated and convincingly
sensitive to the vital differences of degree which distinguish Wilhelmine
The weaknesses

and both from Nazi aggression,
imperialism from Weimar revisionism,
succumb to the temptation to reify "Ger?
although he does occasionally
man policy" and make his story sound rather too pat and conspiratorial.
zeal he occasionally
in his pedagogical
Moreover,
for
nationalist legends;
socialist
and
liberal
myths

threatens

to substitute

for example, he has a
the "masses" and absolve

faint but perceptible
tendency to romanticize
for Austria's misfortunes.
them from responsibility

The book's strengths,
its
It
flaws.
us
with
a solid explanation
far
however,
outweigh
provides
to an expansionist
and strategic importance
Ger?
of Austria's economic
us
a
and
inter?
and
generally
comprehensive
convincing
many,
gives
and its place in early twentiethproblem
affairs.
not
least in importance,
the book
And,
century
which
characterizes so much historical writ?
avoids the tone of self-pity

pretation

of the Anschluss

international

for a nation's fate
ing about modern Austria. Primary responsibility
with
For
all
of
his
the
itself.
rests
country
usually
emphasis on German
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to mention the diplomatic
Grossraumpolitik as a source of evil?not
poli?
cies of the western
locates
the
correctly
governments?Schausberger
ultimate reasons for Austria's demise in the country's
do?
unresolved
mestic

tensions

and the illusory policies of her interwar
external circumstances,"
he concludes,
"but inappropriate
the inescapable
situation of 1938."
The next

leaders.

"Not

politics

led to

three books

less broad in scope
may be grouped together;
sweeping
survey, all deal in some way with what

than Schausberger's
one ofthe
of political
authors, Gerhard Botz, calls the "barbarization
life" in interwar Austria. Botz, one of Austria's more prolific young
scholars, has chosen in Gewalt in der Politik an especially
amorphous
"force"

as a political phenomenon
ofthe
First Republic.
Like
has
a
inhe
didactic
His
defined
he
Schausberger,
goal.
study,
clearly
forms us, is written from the standpoint
of "pacifistic-democratic
enIt is a plea for nonviolence
which seeks to convince
its
gagement."
subject:

methods"
that the effort to con?
through the use of "scientific
trol violence by resorting to violence
is self-defeating,
that force inevi?
and that society must develop
nonviolent
tably breeds counter-force,
means for reducing
and controlling
As a credo, his position
violence.
readers

has much

to recommend

it, but as history the results of his inquiry are
His
surdisappointing.
opening chapter, which rather unsystematically
contributions
to the problem of so?
veys some ofthe recent theoretical
cial violence,
is loosely tied to the body ofthe work, which consists ofa
chronicle
incidents
of political violence
ofthe
between
1918
lengthy
and early 1934?spontaneous
of mass discontent,
eruptions
conspiratorial Putsches, individual
based
acts of terror. This series of vignettes,
on broad reading in newspapers,
is
occaand
trial
records,
police files,
and
statistical
sionally interrupted
by
social-psychological
analysis, and
on the
there is a final chapter in which Botz draws statistical conclusions
basis of his data.
the facade of quantification,
Botz's
however,
of
is not particularly
violence
convincing.
map

Despite

effort to chart a

In many cases,
about the
are simply too small. The attempt to generalize
social backgrounds
and age structure of interwar militants based on evi?
dence relating to only 306 individuals,
for example,
seems dubious.
Botz himself laments the paucity and frequent unreliability
of his data;
precise
his samples

such complaints,
do not absolve him ofthe problems of their
however,
use. Moreover,
that there
the conclusions
which do seem justified?e.g.,
was a "direct connection
and
milibetween
political
unemployment
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and Graz were the most important
centers of
all
too
of
the ob?
assertions
frequently,
political violence?are,
simply
vious. Finally, without
an external standard by which to gauge such
of
as
the
"number
armed
clashes," the "number of victims of polit?
things
tancy,"

or that Vienna

ical violence,"
etc, Botz's conclusions lack wider meaning. Admittedly,
this sort of hard statistical information
about other periods and other
may be hard to come by, but studies of popular violence, es?
for
France and England, do exist; comparison with such studies
pecially
would bring the picture of political violence in interwar Austria into
countries

sharper focus.
the book is not without
merit. Ironically,
the chief
Nevertheless,
in
its most
lies
value of this rather pretentiously
study
methodological
traditional feature: the chronicle of events, the anecdotes, and the bio?
Wherever
Botz trains his lens on the
graphical profiles of individuals.
particular and the unique, his story becomes effective and absorbing.
His vignettes are drawn with vividness and insight; they "localize" the
story of violence and capture something ofthe
First Republic. In the last analysis, it is simply
self which is most enlightening.
C. Earl Edmondson's

The Heimwehr

texture

of life during the
story it?

the detaii ofthe

and Austrian Politics is a less bold

and self-consciously
innovative
study related to the problem of violence
in Austria. Edmondson
concentrates
on the theme of force as maniin the history of one movement?the
Heimwehr?and
the rela?
to the governing
tionship of this organization
clique. His book is a
to
workmanlike
tell
a
to
attempt
political story,
"provide an overall

fested

its goals and ideol?
picture ofthe Heimwehrs origins and development,
Edmondson
ogy, and its role in Austrian politics." Tenaciously,
pursues the often confusing story of the Heimwehr and draws together the
elements of an ignoble tale of conspiracy and churlish ambition. His untedious, but readers will appreciate the Sitzstyle is sometimes
of the
the story. His characterizations
jleisch required to disentangle
Heimwehr chieftains are good, and we get a fairly clear picture of the
inspired

roles played by men such as Seipel and Schober in the rise and fall ofthe
likes of Steidle, Pfrimer, Starhemberg,
and Fey.
Like the Heimwehr leaders themselves,
is primarily
in?
Edmondson
terested not in theory but in pragmatic questions of attaining and exerhe briefly addresses the problem
cising power. In a short introduction,
ofthe Heimwehrs place in the context of twentieth-century
ideology;
but (and many would consider this a virtue) he contributes nothing new
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of fascism.

Drawing
pri?
ideas, he defines the Heimwehr as a species of
as a type oVkonkurrenz
describing it more specifically
"followed
the lead of and competed
with the example

of its larger neighbors."
The organization
never
because
its
leaders
were
such
mediocre
following

won

a genuine mass
condottiere and, more
to nationalism.
"Austrian na?

because it could not appeal
importantly,
tionalism
did not yet exist," he notes, "and the Heimwehr
ultimately
lost its most fervent nationalist
adherents to groups dedicated solely to
it never amounted
Numerically,
bringing about union with Germany."
to more

than a "paramilitary
pressure group" which the forces of cleri?
cal conservatism
were able to use as a "bludgeon"?an
especially
apt
choice of words?to
and suppress social democ?
destroy republicanism
this was done, Schuschnigg
with it altogether,
dispensed
in
it
1936.
dissolving
In general, then, Edmondson
has produced a useful monograph.
Still,
there is a disturbing incongruity
in his presentation
which is symptom-

racy.

Once

deeper flaw of framing and conceptualizing
history in general.
One of the chief vices of historians is the habit of trying to impart a
note of seriousness and universal significance
to their findings by indisatic ofa

I hasten to add
criminately
linking them with the notion of "tragedy."
that I do not completely
subscribe to Fritz Fischer's view that historians
should

entirely "avoid concepts like 'fate, destiny, doom, and tragedy,'
fade into the incomprehensible
and metaphysical."1
The use of
dramatic metaphor is one ofthe historian's legitimate?indeed,
virtually
for structuring
his material; Hayunavoidable?means
and elucidating
den White has recently underscored
of this poetic aspect
the importance
which

craft in his Metahistory (1973). Too often, however?
this is done so
and particularly
in the case ofthe appeal to "tragedy"?
that it debases the concept or contradicts
and thoughtlessly
superficially
ofthe

historian's

Most historians have probably been guilty of this kind of
at
one time or another; the question is not whether they
transgression
should use dramatic devices, but how they use them, i.e., whether the
poetic forms to which they appeal are proper to their evidence and conthe evidence.

the thrust of their arguments.
In fact, what many historians
is "sad story."
really seem to mean when they use the word "tragedy"
The temptation
to succumb to this cloying mannerism
is almost irresistsistent with

1. Fritz Fischer, World Power or Decline: The Controversyover "Germany'sAims in the
First World War" (New York, 1974), p. 124.
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and
of "martyrdom"
or
with
July
"inevitability"?whether
July 1927, February
too powerful
to resist; more?
1938?seem
1934, or February-March
needs of writers
over, they can be effortlessly adapted to the ideological
of the right or the left, or used to mask a political bias.
book because
The problem is all the more obvious in Edmondson's

ible in the case of modern

Austria.

The cliches

associated

so unassuming.
he conscientiously
tries to bal?
Although
ance the ledger of guilt, it is clear that he sees the "tragedy" essentially
from the Christian Social point of view. This becomes most transparent
account ofthe relationship between the Heimwehr and
in his apologetic
it is otherwise

the "humane" dictator, Engelbert Dollfuss. The "sad dilemma" of Dollfuss's reliance on Heimwehr support is described as a "tragedy." Dollfuss
is depicted as the captive of forces beyond his control, a man "driven
into a position in which he had no choice." It was his "sad plight" to
to the right; he had no choice but to suppress parliamen?
As for the February civil war of 1934, "given the contary government.
and outside pressures, there hovers
stellation of past events, personalities,

be "pushed"

an aura of inevitability.
. . . Once the socialists began
Dollfuss
choice
had
little
but to suppress it." More
resistance,
of the evi?
is
satiric representation
Schausberger's
plausible, however,
over the conflict
armed

dence; this entire "dilemma" was not the result of fate, but of conscious
of Christian Socialism's narrow,
choice. It was the logical culmination
In any
circumstance.
antiliberal policies, not a tragedy of inexorable
really gives us is not tragedy, but a quasiin which the
the death of Austrian independence
Heimwehr and the Nazis are the villains, the stubborn Socialists their
unconscious
allies, and Austria (personified by Dollfuss) is the pathetic
victim. But his conclusion
the Heimwehr?that,
though it
regarding
case, what
melodrama

Edmondson
about

for a while a symbol of Austria's independence,
probably hastened the end of Austria"?seems

"became
ments

cable to Dollfuss
Like Botz
barbarization

its accomplishquite as appli-

as well.

and Edmondson,
Gerhard Jagschitz is concerned with the
of politics in interwar Austria, but his book on the Nazi

of 1934 is couched in terms ofthe absurd and grotesque rather
than those of applied social science or high drama. His tale is one of
"confusion and perplexity"
and "human and bureaucratic inadequacy,"

Putsch

of "abused

ideals, the inherent weakness
of criminal romanticism
[and]

ofa

system,
These perceptions

cold

supposedly

authoritarian

Vabanquespiel"
political
are the fruits ofa classic exercise in historical inquiry,
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an attempt to discover what really happened
despite documentary
of much of the evidence.
or falsification
cunae and the distortion

la-

Jag?
schitz emphasizes that many of his findings are tentative, but argues that
to the task of dewell grounded
to contribute
they are sufficiently
focused on the
shrouded
an
emotionalism
events
by
mystifying
long
the course of events, he
reconstructing
as "martyr of
is especially interested in analyzing
the role of Dollfuss
the unresolved
the Austrian idea," and clarifying
question of Hitler's
murder

of Dollfuss.

Aside

from

precise role in the Putsch.
In the case of Hitler, the issue is whether

or indihe was?directly
in
or
whether
the
the
Putsch,
rectly?a
attempted
coup was
participant
Nazis
under
Theo
a
ofthe
Austrian
ofthe
adventurism
simply
product
Habicht. Jagschitz concludes
that the Fuhrer was not directly involved,
but was nonetheless
a passive participant because he strongly suspected
that a plot was taking shape and did nothing to stop it. This conflicted
with the course of moderation
he had just adopted to appease Mussolini,
but here, as in so many other instances, Hitler pursued an intuitive pol?
to swim against the cur?
icy of Mehrgleisigkeit, allowing his subordinates
fortune and his poli?
rent of his mainstream
in
that
policies
anticipation
tical cunning would allow him to capitalize on a fluid situation. When
the Putsch ended in fiasco, Hitler of course feigned ignorance
ofthe en?
tire affair and used Habicht
observations

as a scapegoat.
about Dollfuss?while

not strikingly original
Jagschitz's
?are more sober and considerably
less flattering than those of Edmondson. When he became chancellor, Jagschitz notes, Dollfuss was not well
It is one ofthe remarkable
features of Austrian historiography
known.
of this
that there has been so little scholarly inquiry into the biography
man, who was an advocate of Anschluss for most of his life, but became
a symbol of Austrian independence
to Jag?
at the very end. According
no
for
but
Dollfuss
had
clear
nevertheless
Austria,
schitz,
program
"stood completely
in the tradition of conservative
dissatisfaction
with
he had no preconceived
plan for dismantling
when
the
pretext presented itself he went
parliamentary
government,
about the task with "disregard for the spirit and letter of existing legal
democracy."

Though

In his mind, the most important
way to defend Austria was to
his
distrust
and
social
ofthe irrationality
overpower
democracy.
Despite
anticlericalism
he was willing?even
ofthe Hitlerbewegung,
while pub?
Austrian independence
deal
licly defending
against Nazi terrorism?to
norms."

secretly

with

the Nazis

in an effort

to broaden

the basis of his anti-
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February 1934 he looked for help to gradualists
within the native National Socialist camp. In June and July he initiated
talks with Neubacher,
and Rheinthaller
designed to actiSeyss-Inquart,
Marxist

front.

vate the more

After

of Anschluss against the terrorists
proponents
for a
his
before
Thus, just
death, he laid the foundations
would lead, under his successor, to Austria's incorporation
moderate

under Habicht.
policy which
into the Third

Reich.

the
itself, Jagschitz is unable to answer conclusively
to accident or
question of whether Dollfuss was murdered according
can he deare persuasive arguments on both sides?nor
design?there
On the Putsch

resolve the mystery of the two shots which caused the chan?
finitively
cellor's death. He strongly suggests, however,
that the second shot was
which would help to explain the mantle
fired by a Viennese policeman,
of secrecy east around the "unpleasant" affair by higher police, bureau?
cratic, and military functionaries.
Jagschitz rules out the idea that Emil
in the conspiracy,
but explains how the Viennese
Fey was involved
the situation for his
Heimwehr leader may have tried to manipulate
own

ends.

Jagschitz concludes with some brief but perceptive
efforts of both the Nazis and the Austrian dictatorship
around

the Putsch?the

remarks

on the

to build a myspathos, and

hollow

"banalizing
tique
orgies,
on the one
of Dollfuss
the apotheosis
patriotic kitsch" surrounding
on the other. The Dollfuss
hand, the cult of revolutionary
martyrdom
a
of
effort to consecrate an
was
fundamental
myth
Schuschnigg's
part
of
Austrian
and
traditionalism
to give the dic?
ideology
independence
basis, but this proved to be an illusory
tatorship a popular emotional
defense against the real threat of National Socialist Germany. Though
less successful than the Nazi brand of political mysticism as an ideologi?
cal weapon, in the long run the Dollfuss cult has been the more serious
to historical understanding.
impediment
The last two books deal with a subject which, until the seventies, was
largely ignored by scholars: Austria after the Anschluss, from 1938 to
1945. The first, Gerhard Botz's Die Eingliederung Osterreichs in das deut?
sche Reich, was originally published in 1972 and appeared in a new edi?
tion in 1976. This short monograph,
truly a pioneering
essay, is con?
same
author's
more
successful
than
the
in der Politik.
Gewalt
siderably
Here

is clearly and simply told; the study is an excellent,
everything
concise introduction
to Austria's history as part of the Third Reich.
The book is conceived as a case study in the "style" of Nazi leadership
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and policy formulation.
the party came
Botz argues that Austria?where
to power suddenly and the bureaucracy,
Church, and army were comassociation
with
the
promised by
Schuschnigg
dictatorship?
unpopular
was used by the NSDAP
as a laboratory
for testing the idea ofthe fullblown

1938 and
party state. The policies initiated in Austria between
what was to come in Germany and German1940, then, foreshadowed
controlled
Europe.
Botz contends

that while

general goals and guiding
role it would
the economic

Hitler had certain

principles
concerning
Austria?especially
in
his
new
order?he
had no precisely
play

defined

timetable

for An?

schluss nor clearly formulated
for administrative
Gleichschalblueprint
This
lack
of
and condetailed planning, which led to inconsistency
tung.
tradiction
no means

in execution,
monolithic."

leadership, which was "by
Hitler
an
generally followed
early 1934,
Austria
undermine
from
to
designed
gradually

was typical

of Nazi

From

"evolutionary"
within, without

strategy,
the need for force. This policy was continuous
through
was
in
it
as
accelerated
late
Hitler
be?
1938,
1937,
February
although
came convinced
that Britain would not take a stand on the question of
Austrian
gaden

The meeting
with Schuschnigg
at Berchtesindependence.
the culmination
of this evolutionary
strategy?union
it made Aus?
pressure rather than military conquest?because

represents

through
tria, in effect,

a German

It was only Schuschnigg's
"final act of
the surprise announcement
ofa plebiscite on Austrian in?
desperation,"
for
March
which
Hitler to veer suddenly in
13,
dependence
prompted
favor of an invasion. And only after the invasion had begun?in
the face
of weak

reaction

satellite.

abroad

and, perhaps, his enthusiastic reception in Linz
to break completely
with the evolutionary
course in favor of immediate,
total Anschluss, with no transitional phase.
The invasion was followed
by a Behordenkrieg, and Botz presents a

?did

the Fuhrer

decide

clear overview

of this tangle of rivalries involving
and radi?
moderates
Nazi camp, Frick (the Reich interior minister),
and Keppler (the agent of G6(Hitler's special commissioner),

cals in the Austrian
Burckel

ring's Four-Year Plan). An important part of his message here has to do
with Hitler's "social Darwinian"
leadership style, based on the idea that
the war of all against all would produce the best administrators,
i.e., the
and
more
ruthless.
stronger
As for the broad
Hitler's

key decisions
the initial enthusiasm

Anschluss would take,
shape which administrative
were not made before late April. He knew that
for union

would

give

way

to localism
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solution to this problem was the reorganization
of Austria
long-range
into four Reichsgaue, which implied the destruction not only of "Aus?
traditional provinces as well. Ironically, many ofthe
tria," but ofthe
Nazis' antifederalist
ideas had already been worked out by liberal ad?
vocates

of Anschluss

in the 1920s, such as Hans Kelsen. Ultimately,
reside in the hands of party men, directly responsible to
Austria would serve as a model for administrative
revo?

power would
Berlin. Thus,
lution in Germany

as a whole; the ultimate goal was the final triumph
As
of centralization
over the age-old problem of German particularism.
an Austrian himself, however, Hitler understood the depth of provincial

in Austria, and intervened from time to time to brake the cenBiirckel, the eventual victor in the
tralizing policies ofthe Rhinelander
war. In fact, provincial patriotism was too strong to per?
bureaucratic
loyalties

ofthe plan before the outbreak of war.
mit full implementation
This leads us to Radomir Luza's much broader study of Austria after
1938, the last and, after Schausberger's
the works under review. The "unifying
ence" of Luza's book is the "emergence

survey, the most significant of
theme and focal point of refer?
of Austrian self-consciousness"

to the experience of Nazi Glekhschaltung and the horrors of
Hitler's war. Although written by an American scholar, it, too, is a con?
tribution to the literature of "building an Austrian nation," implicitly

in reaction

the present social and political order in central Europe. Like
supporting
Botz, Luza approaches his subject as a case study, pointing up the "releofthe nature
vance ofthe Austrian problems to a broader understanding
and general style of National Socialism"; Austria was a "testing ground
for long-range
party aspirations."
he covers certain facets
Luza's emphasis is political and administrative;
ofthe
ofthe story only briefly?the
Jews, the role ofthe Catho?
plight
he maintains,
lic Church, the resistance?because,
they have already
too expansive,
been covered in depth elsewhere. His style is sometimes
he lapses into the familiar cliches of Austrian cultural
and occasionally
be?
It is true, of course, that many Austrians genuinely
or
lieve their culture to be uniquely "mellow,"
"humane,"
"refined,"
about the
tells us something
sentiment
and to this extent hackneyed
But the fact that people believe their own
Austrian sense of self-identity.
distinctiveness.

stereotypes does not make them valid and, in fact, Luza's own observa?
tions about Austrian behavior during the war seem to contradict them,
that Luza's analysis is, on
as we shall see. It should be stressed, however,
the whole,

discerning.
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and
of Austria's role in Germany's
general European
and
Botz's
of
that
order
Schausberger,
completes
complements
strategic
often sym?
He presents a judicious,
sketch ofthe mechanics ofAnschluss.
Nazis and
ofthe
Austrian
motives
and
illusions
account
ofthe
pathetic
Lu2a's account

are not one-dimensional,
his portraits of individuals
sympathizers;
but are done in more than one shade of grey. The overall picture ofthe new
war. But it is
order and the new elite is still one of dismal bureaucratic
Nazi

in general?the
deal with the population
passages which
or
to
who
were
forced
offer
masses
"offered
frightful sacri?
anonymous
Lu2a is at his most peneSocialist cause"?that
fices for the National
in those

His picture of the Austrian majority under the
trating and profound.
or "bourgeois,"
to cite the cant of ideology
Third Reich?"proletarian"
not flattering, whether the people are portrayed
and social analysis?is
of collective joy" of March-April
as celebrants in the "explosion
1938,
as the
or as spectators in February 1945, who "still watched hopefully
German divisions rolled . . . on their way to the
fresh, well-equipped
"The
Nazi regime," Lu2a writes, "cannot be treated
front."
Hungarian
in the history of Austria." He speaks of an
as an isolated phenomenon
"affirmative

consensus

until the
among the majority ofthe population
battle of Stalingrad,"
and asserts that even after 1943 support for the
was
least
"lukewarm."
Even in the last months,
at
there was
regime
"no widespread
and
the
of
the
stability
regime
popular resistance,"
In short, the
continued
to rest on the "massive inertia" ofthe populace.
from the majority
of other
people of Austria behaved no differently
Germans. Only in the eleventh hour did they seek "shelter in an awareand individuality.
While
ness of their own distinctiveness
generally
to
the
German
strove
to disvictories,
they
assiduously
ready
profit by
from grossdeutsch
in the hour of distress
sentiments
engage themselves
threat to their lives. The idea of an independent
and of imminent
Aus?
tria won
the time

in the course of Germany's
new importance
defeat, not during
of its success. Modern
Austria was as much the child of ex?

as of strategy and moral principles."
the war, fortune accorded Austria a special place in inter?
Following
and ranational affairs. Allied policy, based on strategic considerations
the
half-truth
that
Austria
was
the
first
"victim"
of
Nazi
tionalized
by

pediency

the Alpine state to escape the full rigors of wardship
on the north. Once again, as after 1918, Austria attained in?
imposed
"almost despite itself." The process of denazification
was
dependence
the half-million
former
slow and incomplete;
Nazi
registered
party
aggression,

allowed
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with their immediate
families, about one-quarter
members?together
of the total population?outnumbered
of the largest
the membership
of
this
and
were
offending
potentially
politicians
wary
postwar party,
important pool of votes. As a result "the democratic regime did not re?
of Austria's National Socialist past and
sort to a thorough examination
showed great restraint?hitting
back at Hitler and his Austrian henchmen but playing down the anti-Nazi rhetoric and disregarding
sideration of Austria's share of the Nazi activities. Basically
Nazism

Austrian
edge

its Austrian

as an import from Germany and failed to acknowlof this climate of
roots." Against the background

"smug assurance,"
rather
domination
growth

any conit viewed

of Austrian

if it was not actually
of Hitler which
than the memory
one wonders

state and national

fear of Soviet
nourished

the

after 1945.
that we should seek the sober-

consciousness

picture
Perhaps it is in this melancholy
ofthe Austrian experience
since 1918, and not
ing human significance
in the false solemnity of pseudotragedy.
Tragedy requires a hero; heroes
in
the
can be discovered,
history of Habsburg Austria before
perhaps,
1918, but they are difficult to find in the period between 1918 and 1945.
The material ofthe Austrian story, it seems, is more properly related to
the ironic mode of Hannah Arendt's "banality of evil" than to the lofty
of tragedy.
But if banality and tragedy are incompatible,
banaHty and comedy
are not, and it is on a note of comic resolution that Luza concludes his
seriousness

this is one of Luza's central themes?National
story. Paradoxically?and
in the Austrian context.
Socialism acted as a "modernizing
ideology"
. . with its retarded
Interwar Austria was "still essentially semi-feudal.
social
based

preoccupations
on small-scale

and stabilized

class structure"

National

production.
order and laid the foundations

Socialism

and its economy
undermined
this

for large-scale
industrial?
ization; after 1945, "Austria was on its own with a reoriented economy
shackles of the
and a social structure largely free of the quasifeudal
order." These revolutionary
old conservative
changes made
powerful
for
a
new
in the
the
basis
confidence
in
turn,
psychological
possible,
anachronistic

state; Austria's leaders were now ready to accept the idea that indepen?
desirable as well. Thus, Lu2a
dence was a necessity, and economically
view of Hitler's significance
adapts to Austria the currently widespread
for Germany as a whole, which has been cogently expressed by Gordon
while destroying
Craig: "In his career of self-aggrandizement,
that was good in Germany and many thousands of people who
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much that was
better, Hitler also eliminated
bad_He
destroyed the basis ofthe traditional resistance to modernity
and liberalism just as completely
as he had destroyed the structure ofthe
Rechtsstaat and democracy-Hitler
... not only restored to [the Ger?

have

made

that

good

the options that they had had a century earlier but.
to them the memory
of horror to help them
queathed
choice."2

mans]

2. Gordon A. Craig, Germany 1866-1945 (New York, 1978), pp. 763-64.
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